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3INT HOrueTION
Problem of Thesis
The purpose of this paper is carefully to search out
the thought of Hoyce on the suhjeot of personality. This sub-
ject is a center of concern for most philosophical thought of
the present time. The most flourishing schools of philosophy;
pragmatism, realism in i^is several interpretations, ana idealism;
all are interested either in magnifying of minimizing the impor-
tance of personality. Among idealists especially this is the
subject of paramount interest and of not a little controversy,
Royce probably did more than any other American phil-
osopher to bring idealism to the place of preeminence it enjoyed
particularly during the early years of the present century, and
the last decade of so of the past century. The philosophy of
this period, whether I'aturalistic of Idealistic, helA to a fund-
amental monism in the nature of reality. Such a conception of
reality we think of as essentially quite inflexible and such as
would not adequately deal with unique free persons. Ordinarily
this is the case, yet a sympathetic study of Hoycean thought
reveals on the whole a. wholesome, comprehensive attitude in re-
gard to personality.
General facts regarding Personality
Yi/e hear a great deal today about personality, Books
are written about it by psychologists, psychoanalysts, economists
and anyone who may be remotely interested from any point of
view. It is often interpreted and misinterpreted in newspapers
and magazine articles and even in advertisements. On the
c
4whole such current interpret at. ions are merely surface. Con-
sequently one needs the depth and richness of the philosophical
background to fully appreciate the significance of personality.
Its roots lie deep in, and are ineztricatly "bound up with the
various phases of philosophical thought.
i'he philosophical school that is most interested in
personality derives its name ty virtue of this emphasis, i.e.
personal idealism or personalisra. Its fundamental postulate
is that reality consists of a community of free persons.
Idealistic thought of recent years has largely shifted from
the monistic conception to this thoroughgoing pluralism, just
as naturalistic thought has shifted from a materialistic monism
to a pluralistic realism.
iioycean iPhilosophy Productive of Various Lines of Study
iiike almost every philosophy possessing originality
ai.d force that of .ioyce shows him a creative thinker and one
who has studied widely and thought deeply on the pro'bleras of
philosophy in their sense. He was not merely interested in
working out a satisfactory system, but v/as stirred by the deep-
est needs anc^ desires of humanity in its struggles of thought
and spirit. His feelings on this point he shows in the follow-
ing words:- "There is after all no beauty in a metaphysical
system, which does not spring from its value as a record of
SDiritual experience. And alas for me if for professional
reasons I must read a book uehind which I catch no glimpse of
(1)
the manly heart of its author."
Hence his interests are as manysided as the interestis
cc
-r-a'.
5of man, a study of the writings of Joyce yields much fruit
for the philosophy of religion. i'hen too, besides his text
on psychology, discussion of the psychological oearing of
problems recurs occasionally Tihroughout his uooks. j'or ethics,
with his use of loyalty, he develops thoroughly a very ade-
quate formalistic conception. His metaphysics constitutes
probably the best American statement of an idealistic monism.
By the use of logic, particularly in his later thought, he
sought increasingly to correlate and integrate the elements
of reality into a closer unity. It was his avowed intention
to make this unity of the Absolute Self a more persoi.al one
thar. he had attained in his earlier thought.
The works of Royce do not deal with the different
phases of reality, or of thought, in the order in which I
will give them. His thought on personality is not contained
in a separate volume but it must be found by study through
his treatment of the various phases of philosophy as they pre-
sented uhemselves to him. ilis best and iaost comprehensive
work on the Self is found in his comparatively late volumes,
Ihe iiorld and the Individual,
P^-iSOliALI ilY IK xmLOoOi?HY
Development
In taking up the study of personality with .^oyce,
this paper seeks to start with his starting point, i.e, the
j)mpirical ^go. In other words we start with such facts and
characteristics as we acceie a person to possess. Ihe further
development of the paper has been rather a logical order of
c
6approach than the order in which they were developed and em-
phasized. Chronologically, following his initial empirical
emphasis, came a strong stress on the Mature of God, the
Absolute One, and his All-comprehensiveness. After this v/as
the los-ical perfection of Joyce's metaphysical system. Here
his principle of individuation was evolved and his ethical
theory elaborated. Finally in his later years the idea of the
community was strongest with .ioyce and the social nature and
implications of Selfhood swayed his thought and feeling.
In the development of this paper following the i^in-
pirical Self is placed elaboration of the idea of the social
Self. xhe metaphysical setting of personality logically
follows, and finally completion of the person is seen in the
Absolute. Again waile this order is no& the order in which
the different phases of selfhood receive consecutive emphasis
by ?.oyce himself, it is probaoly the order of importunce of
these phases in consideration of the whole body of his thought,
i'he concept of the Absolute One undoubtedly most fully char-
acterizes it as a whole. J^'rom this we have the philosophioal
title by which xiioyce is most commonly known, i.e. Absolute
Idealist. He is ^mo^im as an Ethical Idealist, from the strong
ethical trerd of his metaphysics. In one instance at least
(a)
he applies this title to himself. In consideration of his
social emphasis, his thouprht has been termed by V/ahl as, "a
(3)
sort of Cosmic Sociology" Again his philosophy is called
by .tiley, "i^oraantic Idealism", which "has as its chief ac-
tivities the cultivation of the inner life; an enlargement
of the powers of personality; and a cosmic imaginatioi^ v/hich

7strives to express all phenomena in terras of the Infinite,
(4)
the Absolute. '*
Importance of Personality in xioycQ*s Philosophy
In all these changes of .toyce's thought the suljject
of hufnai. persoi.ality is dealt .vith at considerable length,
yet it is far from the chief concern of his thought, j'inite
personality seems rather submerged in his emphasis upon the
Absolute, upon the community of mankind in v;hich each of us
is but a fragmentary part possessing some unique function.
It is true that he seeks to make CJod, the Absolute Self, person-
al in esnential nature. Personality followed out then v/ith
Hoyce is not so much a private finite possession, a culmination
of finite selfhood, as it is the bond that gives us kinship,
-
yes, and oneness with the V.'orld Spirit.
So it comes to ue that human personality is not
something complete and self-sufficient, ohe huu so to speak
of the universe. liather it is not understooi at all apart
from its whole cosmic setting. Self-consciousi^ess , the out-
standing mark of a free persoi^ as we shall see, is dependent
upon and suosetiuent to social experience, jj'urthermore the
implications of self-consciousness carries it ever oeyond
itself to the "world Person, in whom and by v/hom finite persons
have their completion and perfection.
Ic
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Smpirical Status of the 3go
Hoyce expresses his thoag-ht iii the clearest of lan-
guage, and at the same time in such a way that it is hard to
find any flaw in its logical development. He does not begin
by defining and nicely circumscribing the nature of the j2go,
and afterwards making his thought conform to those adopted
standards. father it is something to ue soaght out and fathom-
ed and understood, not so much an entity in itself, as oeing
interrelated in experience \7itn the whole world. nis apxjroach
to the great proolems of xife, as laced in philosopnical spec-
ulation, was thorough ai^d empirical methods, ne accepted
as realism does the world jast as it is, but was not content
to let it remain so seemingly chaotic. He deemed it better by
the el'forts of thought, to approach and "untie the meshes" of
Reality, than to begin by accepting as inevitable a brute world
of facts. ?or "conceive it as a realm of pure scientific theory;
and, so far as your knowledg-e reaches, it is full at once with
the show of a noble order, ani of hints of a vain chance. On
the other hand conceive it as a realm of values, attempt to
(1)
estimate its worth, and it baffles you with caprices." Yet
despite the baffling uncertainty of experience it is our only
sure guide to an understanding of the center of personal human
values, the -Sgo.
W'e do not find a precise schdme of things pertaining
to life in existance a priori to our search. All facts of
nature and of life are collected in fragmenca uecause they co;ne
€/
9to us in that manner whether we v/ill or no. i'he strength
of a philosophy and its ade4.uacy will depend not upon how
oompletely it can categorize but upon how thoroughly it in-
terprets these facts. I'o ue interpreted means that every
tit of experience, every fragment of knowledge thus attained,
must ue considered as an element, as a detail in a perfect
whole; as, perhaps, somehow having a place to fill. Such
interpretation is the task of philosophy. Just so, the human
Ee*o is to be accepted as existing not as an independent real
unit, but as something to be interpreted and understood in
terms which {?ive it meaning in relation to all the world, to
the whole of being.
It is an undeniable fact of fundiraental importance
that whatever knowledge v/e have is based on matters of experience
that of ourselves or that of someone else. What further
knowledge we might claim must be discounted. At the same time,
when we make the span of our knowledge the measure of all
things, vve do an absurd thing. How aosurd, how incongruous,
to limit eternity to the standards of human life, or measure
that which is cosmic in thu limited terms of finite scales.
It is no better than the savage would do, when he finds a
multiplication of himself in the hills, and trees and beasts.
This brings us into a seeming paradox wherein reconciliation
is effected by a closer study of the self itself. "The self",
Royce says, '*is so little a thing merely guessed at as the
unknowable source of experience, that already, in the very
least of daily experierces you unconsciously know him as some-
thing present,- yet we do not recognize him." It is no thing
pc
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in itself in the sense that that is usually understood. He
is not an entity apart from the experiences by whose aotivitiea
we are Tiade to acknowledg-e his existanoe. iSxperience may "be
said to contain him, and in return this Sgo is the soul of it
and constitutes its reality,
Y/hen such emphasis is laid upon experience we must
inquire at once as to what the objects of experience are.
Commonly we think of experience as having to do with faces of
external objective reality. Pacts are stubborn and persistient
things and must be accounted for, Uhls leads many to posit
the actual oeing of a material world; and t,his seems oo accord
with the verdict of common sense. How else, it is asked, can
we account for things which undeniably affect us? 2o this
Hoyce, and in fact all idealism, answers that matter, lifeless,
inert matter, is no more stubborn than ideas. There is as gen-
uine reality in the inner as the outer experiences, and they
are just as apt to resist our desires, or our progress. Royce
gives a striking expression to this in the Spirit of Modern
Philosophy.- "Let those who have refuted Bishop Berkeley's
idealism by the wonder why he did not walk over every precipice
or into every fire if these existed only in his ideas, let such
I say, first try some of the fires and precipices of the inner
life, ere they decide that dangers cease as soon as they are
(3)
called ideal, or even subjectively ideal in me." Indeel,
while much of our experience is concerned with that which we
think of as matter, it is i^o more vital to us than that recog-
nized aa ixeal.
I€
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Characteristics of Self-Gonsoiousnesa
Jhe concern of this paper, however, is wii^h the
environment oi the Self only as Iz is implicitly bouiid up
with its very nature and its relation to reality, \iQ want
now to examine the nature of self-consciousness which is the
most outstanding feature in the development anu. stability of
personality, "What we mean liy self consciousness, in any one
man, is an enormously complex function or rather a little
(4)
world of functions.'* These center about established habits
by which we know from the outside somewhat of the state of
one's consciousrjesg. A normal person must also be able clearly
to explain himself apart from all others by unique character-
istics of his own physical, personal, and social life. There
also is a sort of inner notion of the self of self-conscious-
ress of v/hich it is hard to give an account. It seems to feel
the immediate self to be vague whole which may be subject in
specific localities to feelings and experiences,- a toothache
localiiies and makes coiisciousixesa specific and in doing so
changes such a locality into environment rather than any
actual part of self, Seyond all this inhere is a feeling of
self-possession, of a power to control and direct the outward
and known inner conduct. Through the associative faculty,
and by reason of the countless relationships through v/hich
every part of a conscious life becomes linked by experience,
and of which feeling keeps us aware, this inner sense is made
to shift coiistantly and it sometimes seems very uiistable and
undependable by reason of conflict. Yet it constantly reasserts

1£
its right to choose and to guile the course of personal ex-
perience.
Self-consciousness, furthermore, possesses the
quality of taking all the experiences of life, diverse as they
may "be, and so linking past, present, and future together that
there seems to he no break whatever. Fot Hoyce the self is
not a datum lout a medium for experiencing and interpretating
the realities of the ideal realm. Unless the self of present
consciousness can take the diversified, ever shifting facts of
life and give them meaning it accomplishes nothing. Its very
being is a vague and vain abstraction. "However a man may
come by his ideal of himself, che self is no mere datura, but
is in its essence a life which is interpreted, and which in-
terprets itself, and which apart from some sort of ideal in-
terpretation, is a mere flight of ideas of a meaningless flow
of feelings, or a vision that sees nothing, or else a oarren
(5)
aostract conception." So it is that lioyce holds the in-
dividual ego to De iij itself incomplete. At the ScV'.:e time it
possesses the capacity of interpreting in its own way the
larger complete 5?elf. ?or itself alone and without this active
power of ideal self-interpretation is meaningless and value-
less.
While the self for P.oyce is not a datum, still it
somehow forms the core of experience. As it will be brought
out later in another connection, this must oe understood as
suplemented by the Absolute experience. >/hether the self is
originally a fragmentary part of the Aosolute we do not ki.ow.
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Yet we do know that it is the nature of tho'ght. of conscious-
ness to move constantly into circles of ever greater complexity
and widening reach. Beginning with the first consciousness in
the child there is constant enlargement not only of the view-
point tut of lihat which constitutes selfhood itself.
We have come think that "by a man's self you mean
a certain totality of facts, viewed as more or less immeaiate-
ly given and distinguished from the rest of the world of Qe-
(6)
ing. " ilhis totality of facts is Doth external aiid internal
and makes up what we know ourselves or anyone else to be. Any
alteration oi such self-distinguishing facts alters the actual
nature of the self. ?or instance a certain person is known as
one who has a certain physical appearance and hearing; and one
who has characteristiQ ways of reacting to circumstances. Any
real variation of any of these regards we consider a basis for
questioning the normality of this person. Such is an empirical
view and one necessarily external, of the self. Otherwise any
designation would be too subjective for any but self-identi-
fication.
jilmpirical Vs. Logical Approach
»Ve havd seen the status oi the Individual at the out-
set of the search of a coherent syste.a of knowledge, and out
of the experiences of a finite self-conscious Individual we
have come to recognize that it is not something very simple
and easily understood, as so-called common sense demands, we
take the world just as it is. Then out of the bewildering
Ic
14
aiid oonflicting variety of ©xperierices by whioh we come to
know it we are to find what ooiielusions seem to postulate
themselves. However, speculative thought does not usually
use this procedure. It proceeds woraewhat as follows; an out-
line is drawn up as to how the world ought to "be, that has
its limits in infinity, then it is neatly marked off ir. com-
partments, and finally data are deliberately collected and
made to fit into place in the 'system'. But it is not so
with those who consistently follow empirical proceedure.
All the consequences of accepting human personal experience
in all its flux and caprices cannot be foreseen. So from the
numerous contradictions i'c offers can one hope go derive any-
thing coherently worthwhile? Will it furnish anything but
wearisome problems?
Such a method has ios decided appeal. Very Oxten
however there; is too literal acceptance of affairs as they are
discovered. i'he vicissitudes of fortune and of very o^ing to
which we seem humanly heir are accepted as the decree of fate.
We simply must make the most \7e can of the chaotic conditions
of life and of the universe. On the other hand, others find
in the world of so-called facts a universe of inanimate matter
and animate life; a world of inexorable, unwavering law. They
seem to take delight in systematizing and cataloging with re-
spect to their own particular fateful laws, every group of
facts known to man. Thus there is the realm of chemistry, of
biology, of psychology, and so on and on.
Somewhere mediating between these two extreme
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positions regarding the data of experience we find true ideal-
ism. I-Tot only does it accept as absolutely true and real such
facts of experience hut goes further and seeks beneath the
externals to understand their true meaning. ilspecially is
idealism interested in relating thus by spiritual signification
the world experienced and the person who is subject of che ex-
perience. In carrying out this program, Royce has kept close
to the things we know by experience. He seems, as he soars
into the realm where all meaning is coraplece and coherent in
the Absolute, co get far from finite experience. But repeat-
edly affirms that we kiiow absolutely nothing beyond experience.
It is true that in our moments of insight we have a faint
momentary glimpse into the world of deeper reality. Yet these
moments but bind us in experience and knov/ledge with our larger
selves that are constantly being enfolded with growing self-
consciousness.
If out of the fficts of self-consciousness, a? it
develops, certain conclusions are drai^n, certain logical
implications result, then loe^ic supplements and completes the
empirical approach. There need not be any contradictions in
the two methods, so long as logic carries us only to further
realms of experience.
Importance of Gontrctst- j;ffects
Selfhood as we must view it empirically is most com-
plex, isy a Self in ohe sense of a human moral individual, or
person we think of a variety of facts; externally as actions.

16
physisiUQ, olo thing; ai.d internally as though cs, e:notion3,
moods, and the like all clustering about and composing in
unreflective thinking the person himself. Critical thought,
however, is not satisfied with such a variable and general
statement of what selfhood is. Beyond Lhis diversity of human
experiences iz seeks to find the basis of a unified depend-
able selfhood.
A close scrutiny of the manner in which knowledge
is empirically appropriated and made our own "brings to light
a basis for Selfhood. Analysis shows us that what we consider
our own ideas were at first foreign to us. Perhaps it was in
the instance of some opinion being imparted to us, or some
bit of knowledge received. As it entered our consciousness
it was recognized as not belonging to us. But when we thought
it ourselves it was accepted as our o\m. Thus, most of what
we are has been externally received, in ohe teaching of parents,
teachers, or of various traditions. We constantly recognize
the difference kjetween ourselves and these foreign elements,
between x;he jigo and the non-a:igo. Yet uaere is no 'Swateaole
rule' by .vhich we distinguish ohat which is ours and Dhat which
is not. ;;hile we do not consciously follow any rule, a psy-
chological principle invariaoly applies. It is than there is
basis for the distinction in our contrast with our social en-
vironment. In the environment into which a child is born,
then, the social influences are more important than any others
in bringing about the empirical development of the self. For
the presert we will simply consider environment as undifferen-
tiated.
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The Finite Self never prets any finally definable
unity. It car never, at any time, "be observed as a single
fact to our consciousness. But with the passing and accum-
ulating of experiences it grows and at the same time dif-
ferentiates itself from what in its experience is the rest of
the world,
ITorraing the basis, of self-consciousness and finally
of personality, are the comparatively constant organic een-
sations. These greatly aid in identifying our ^pirical ii^go
over against everything outside it. "The ego soax^ds as
that totality of inner and outer experience which I recognize
as my own. Just oecause it sharply differs from my experience
of any of the rest of mankind, and it stands in a sort of
( 7)
permanent eontrast thereto.
"
If we accept this line of thought then it becomes
evident that the empirical ego is after all subsecuent in
origin to the social experience. The self as conscious of
itself cannot be said to exist until by the series of con-
trast affects to which it is subjected in its environment,
it recop-nizes itself as the one constant. A continuation of
this contrast cuickens and deepens self-consciousness after
it is once created. There are times of comx)lete abandon, as
when under strong emotional stress or under keen physical
stimulation the self is completely forgotten. Such a temporary
forgetting of self may come when we enter with zest into some
invigorating play or sport, or it may ue wheix we forget our-
selves completely in following tin interesting story, or bit
r
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of poetry, or even soientifio discover/. Still again we may
lose sight of ourselves at times of spiritual or religious
meditation, when one is lost in Gomniunion with God. It is
at suoh tines thau we are our "urue selves. The veneering
influences of uhe environment are lifted and we touch reality.
Ideation
There must he more than a single contrasting of
ego with non-ego. xhat would De little more than a purely
physiological awareness, which for serious critical thought
is untenable. So far the contrasts leading the way to at-
tainment of self-consciousness and personal selfhood have
teen mainly external. Unless we trace something of its in-
ner development an'l form, a self would he nothing more than
a system of responces, A person would be only a mechanical
independent Pomethinff that possessed the capacity of respond-
ing to outside impulses and as Hoyce has it, "upon occasion
(6)
to strike back,"
Before we can be actually said to iaiow anything of
the world of external fact, or in idealistic language, the
world of possible experience, it must be made our own. It
must be relived and repeated in the inner life until it is
no more exteri.al but is a natural part of our conscious life,
We see this particularly in the child who "carries over his
plays into more or less ideal realms, lives in the co:apany
of imaginary persons, tLud, uhus
,
idealizing his social re-
lations idealizes also the type of his geif-consciousness.
€J
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In my inner life, I in uhe end learn ideally to repeat, to
vary, to reoognise, and to epitomiiie in ooiintless ways, the
situations which I first learned to observe and estimate in
(8)
literal social relations."
Thus is is that selfhood viewed empirically gets
its most general formulation. Memory and imagination are the
psychological processes by which this ideation of the self is
brought about. These principles tie the inner life up in count-
less ways with the environment. Yet the presentation we thereby
get of the sell is rot of a rational independent entity. It
ratler is a self just because of its relationships and aannot
be defined of understood apart from them, "Precisely as here
upon earth we have no abiding city, just so, in our present
human form ox consciousness, the Self is never presented
except as a more or less imperfectly organiijed series ox
experiences, whose contrast with those of all otiier men
fascinates us intensely, but whose final meaning can simply
never be expressed ix^ the type of experience which we men
now have at our disposal. 7/ere our life not hid in an infin-
itely richer and more significant life behind the veil, we
who have once observed the essential fragmentariness of the
empirical 3go would indeed have parted with our hope of a
(9)
true Selfhood."
iI
j
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OHAPT^R II
SOCIAL 0? m31 331?
c
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SOCIAL UATUliS OF THJJ
The Moral Person Never Detached from Society
?rom the standpoint of relationship of Lhe moral self
to other phases of reality it was necessary to "begin the paper
ty eTiphasizing the personal experience of individuals. Further
"because of the empirical approach to the nature of personality,
anything having zo do with the origin or development of self-
consciousness, which represents its essential spiritual nature,
could not "be developed at length. :?oyce lists three interpreta-
tions of the self teyond the empirical. Tho realistic conception
he dealt witn 'Driefly "but felt iu to be most inadeciuate. A
second interpretation, and one strictly idealistic, rests on an
ethical basis. This is orie .^oyce develops most fully, and will
appear later in uhis paper. lae third we will now consider, the
social.
First however, a brief reference should "be made here
to his criticism of Kant's critical philosophy. Kant's world
was made up of perceiving moral agents, the vague, unknowable
things-in-themselves , and what is postulated by the practical
reason. Hoyce feels that there are too great gaps in this con-
ception, and that it fails of a true unity. He would have the
universe, all being as of one piece. That 'other' which is
beyond us, deeper and more comprehensive than us- as finite per-
sons, :^oyce makes simply further possible experience; whereas
for Kant this could not be truly known but only postulated. God,
then for I^oyce, is not a far-away, unapproachable being uut is
imminent in the world, back of each and all of us
,
joining us
into a social as well as a metaphysical real- oneness.
c
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MORAL HiJVjlR I'3TACH3D F?.0!.! SOGIjITY
Genesis of Self-Consciousness: Social Implications
We have considered the development of the 2Igo, from
the general standpoint of experience. How we will follow in
its social relationships its development and perhaps learn
something more tangiule atout its nature.
In our earliest experiences in the world, with the
first awakening of consciousness, we are in close touch with
the social life of the environment into which we are "uorn.
Self-consciousness is at first seemingly the result of a con-
trast of ego and non-ego. Yet how 4,uickly we make what we see
in the world our own. - In truth "our empirical self-conscious-
ness depends upon a series of contrast-effects, whose psycho-
logical origin lies in our literal social life, and whose con-
tinuance in our present conscious life whenever we are alone, is
due to habit, oo our memory of literal social relations, and to
(1)
an imaginative idealization of the relations.'
It is almost axiomatic that no one ever comes to self-
consciousness except under constant social influences. Gen-
etically the first sigiis of awakening interest in the world,
presap-inp actual self-consciousness, is found in imatativeness.
Prior to the manifestation of interest, the child m.akes no dis-
tinction between itself and things external to it,. The fact is,
to the small child, everything is immediate. The moon appears
as much an object to ue desired and possosse i as a rattle. Then
auout the oime the child learns to uu-lk, every Object, including
itself, exists impersonally. That is, the self is not rec-
ognized as existing apart from, other objects, at least as
€
separate from all objects. Then as the ohild comes into social
relations 77ith its fellows it instinctively imitates and re-
produces as best it can what it sees in others. Without any
conscious thought at first, the child in appropriating what it
sees in others, contrasts with them, conr.tantly questions, and
through social harmonization or rivalry comes to self-conscious.
The moving force of imitation and the psychological
principle upon which it depends is interest. This interest in
life and the world, manifests itself in two ways. First there
is an active effort toward self-expression. There is an "inter-
est in discriminating between the doings of other individuals and
(^)
the present deeds of one's own organism." But as we try to im-
itate we can never exactly repeat what is taken as a model for
imitation. The native characteristics and habits previously
formed alter it somewhat. This is illustrated by considering
every such attempt as a triad made up of; ''(1) the original act-
ivities of the imitative being, the activities of the model,
(3)
and, Ko) the imitative act itself." This third member of the
triad lies somewhere between the others. In just such a manner
every act of our lives is just such an approximation to that
which we hold as a model or perhaps an ideal of how we should
act. The self comes to be, in a sense, "a series of results of
(4)
intermediation." This is one form of statement of the ^elf-
Hepresentative, Infinite Series which Royce used quite often.
The second way in which the self-consciousness is
developed by imitative adjustment to the social environment
is through the trial and error process. There is an interest in
J
as
persistently seeking, and trying out new plana, of courses of
action, perhaps using such as appear at random. Then, proLably,
by accident a plan is found which it is desirable to pursue.
This later method is commonly explibited by psychologists, the
chance element in it seeming to be especially over-emphacized.
However, this ^ust as truly represents what may be an uncon-
scious, striving toward social models, iJach trial which proves
successful is an approximation to the model, finding its inter-
mediate place. In either case there is an urge in the rery
nature of conscious life to fill in the deficiencies, the gaps
that finiteness is heir to, and approach uhe perfection rep-
resented by a well ordered series.
As one follows the growth of self-consciousness in
the child, it can but ue observed that two lives are being lived;
"one naive, intensely egoistic from our point of view, but
relatively free from any marked self-consciousness in the child*3
own mind, while his other life is the life in which he develops
(5)
his conscious ideas and views himself as a person." The first
life is the natural expression given to imoulses, passions and
(6)
the like. The other and "relatively Fielf-conscious life," is •
the life of the Imitator. In this last the child impersonaoes,
poses and plays horse or doccor or general. These two lives of
course intertwine yet always retain the possibility of separation.
The naive naturalness of the child becones imbued by the social
relationships in which its own self-consciousness emerges. But
its own particular interpretation of all it meets in life gives
it a distinct personality, Some accident or maladjustment between
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these separate livesybf each self oause to sometimes to become
not normal. Herein is the explanation of the most of the
cases of multiple personality.
According to the current Freudian psychology, this
naive self is inextricably bound up by the sex life, iilvery
movement and cevelopraent of childhood can only be explained
by its relation to sex they say. Maladjustments, thei., result
from a repression of the sex instincts,- the result of mis-
guided social traditions and usages.' This seems to me to be
a most unwholesome, perverted conception of our essential
nature. It is true, and is borne out by Hoyce and all sound
constructive thinkers that the physical basis of selfhood is
essential. Yet, merely one phase of that will not truly ex-
plain all the facts of selfhood. This Freudian conception may
be a more or less adequate explanation of the abnormal features
of personality; yet it is a wrong method of procedure to nake
the normal esplainable by the abnormal. After all the self is
not some simple entity that can be explained by any single
phase of the activity by which we know it. Hather as we shall
now see with Hoyce, the meaningfulness of selfhood comes
through all its social relationships.
Selfhood has Meaning through Social Experience
The self as we know it, or uncritically think of it,
is a system more or less complete in itself; of current mental
states, of feeling tones which mean physical being, and such
association linkages that we can get into instant touch with
fI
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past and future, the hear or remote of experience. Viewed more
analytically the self seems not nearly so independent and complet
in itself. So much of what we know of the sfelf is linked to
other selves that it is little more than a cipher alone. "The
characters, attributes, functions or other organic constituents
of the self commonly extend, from our point of view, decidedly
heyond anything that can be directly presented in any series
( 7)
of our isolated inner experiences, however extended." In the
instance of vanity or of guilt, one has within his self-consoious-
ness the notion that he exists in some way immediately before,
or in the presence of his fellows. A consciousness of praise
or blame attend these elements of his selfhood that are thus
present to the experience of others.
Because of the presence of other selves self-conscious-
ness possesses something it could not otherwise possibly possess.
Herein is the best, the heart and essence of personality. It
brings social position and with it dignity Of bearing, o^^^acter,
and such purely social characteristics as confidence, of bash-
fulness or shame. In fact nearly all virtues are ultimately of
social origin. Courage looks to the approval of fellows perhaps
in the face of danger or in a common cause. Unless one has
such real relations to his fellows, to society, there is no
basis for estimation of external importance and worth.
So at first while there was simply a contrast of ego
with non-ego, we see it has come to be the contrast between our
own feelings, wishes, and meanings and what we conceive as that
which is similar in other egos. Our conscious states c^re now
c
suggestioiiS of specific social situations, ai^d outwardl/ the
acts of our lives are bound up with our fellows in social
communion.
Selfhood as Social A Priori to Actual Self-Consciousness
There is a tendenc;/ in 'nodern thought, more par-
ticularly in the field of theoretical ethics, to make a great
deal of the conflict between Egoism and Altruism. Prevail-
ingly the emphasis is to make the egoistic instinct "Che primary
one, and to consider self-preservation and self-realization as
fundamental. Altruism is often viewed as slowly growing out
of a subordination of this natural selfishiiess. Ix is derived
then from a developing self-consciousness. Hoyce does not.
believe that this actually expresses the true condition. "ihis
whole customary popular and philosophical ppposition uetween
a man's self-consciousness, as if it were something primitive
and lonely, and his social consciousness, as ii it v/ere some-
thing acquired, apart from his self-consciousness, through
(6)
intercourse with his fellows, is false to human nature." In
reality self-consciousness is attained only in very close touch
with the growing social consciousness. One does not have con-
sciousness of self in the first place by virtue oi some innate
attitude in which the self is the beginning and consoant center
of refereLce; but because there is an alter, other real or ideal
selves to which contrast is made. This contrast, ther, is
responsible for a consciousness of self, "I cani.ot really will
to preserve the ego, then,- this derived conscious creature of
the habits of my social consciousness without also willing
c
(9)
to preserve and to defend some sort of alter." So from the
very first the self acts in conscious reference to social
demands. Its very "being rescs upon its social contrasts. Con-
sequently, in a cense the altruistic instinct could be said
not only to exist prior to the egoistic but to havtj prior rights.
The master muso will the being and preservation of the slave or
there is no condition of mastery. The tyrant must will health
and strong charac oeris tics , and a measure of prosperity of his
subjects; for without a numerous and devoted people he could
not be a tyrant. This may De 'bad altruism' but it is not ego-
ism.
Genuine egoism as contrasted to the naive uixconscious
egoism of the child is attained only after one comes to rel-
atively complete self-consciousness, I'heiJ conscious egoistic
sentiments can be abstracted from the variety arid wealth of
social relationships upon which self-consciousness depends,
THE COL^TOTITY. A HI :H'il SSLF
Quality of Social-Consciousness
We have see-n that not only the full human personality
known to society but. the very ego itself gets its very being
by reason of its contrasts with what first was simply non-ego
but took uhe social from the alter-ego. This reality external
to the ego was a world of other experience which could become
that of the ego. The child upon imitating an act of some pcir-
son gets coiaiected with that act what is his own inner meaning
of it, iiepetition of it in circums canoes similar to that in
which it ,va3 first seen performed, gives it also an objective
€C
meaning to the child. i'his real meaning upon interpretation
is conceived as the inner experience of the other fellow.
But while anyone's imitation is of necessity faulty and inter-
pretation not exact, actual corarnunication, though most essential,
is difficult. ''Thus my self- consciousness and my social con-
sciousness, each helped aiid each limited by the other, since
each exists only in contrast with other, gets organized and
developed in the endless giving and taking of social com-
(10)
munication." 'i'he world that is more or less imperfectly com-
municated to me|Ls a real world. V/e will learn something more of
it and our metaphysical relations to it later. But for the
present it is necessary to at least refer to a doctrine belong-
ing to metaphysics, to understand any coherent social relation-
ship.
In our own individual, personal lives, all the sep-
arate acts and choices and hopes of past, present, and future
are unified and made our personal property, aijout the ideal
of v/hat our self is and means. Jusz so there are larger selves
and in which our-selves are incluaea. j.'he ideal bonds by which
selves are cemented together into communities ar^ as real as
these which unify our private selves. The principle which
Royce posits as serving this function, and one which serves
as the mainspring of moral personality is that of loyalty, "the
willing- and practical and thorogoing devotion of a person to
(11)
a cause." The only difference would be in the'cause';
whether it rjere an individual one, or one com'^on to the group.
The community, the society into which each of us is
born, has its own characteristics, has a unity of life of its
iV
1
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own. In this we realize ourselveL so to speak, '*we do not
take our point of departure, as it were, in the prison of
inner life, and then argue ourselves into the belief in
other minds on the basis of analogy. Our consciousness is,
in truth, from the first social, and one rounds to a separate
mind only by defining his omi interests and purposes within
(1^)
the unity of the mind of the community." Y/e become, ohus,
individual selves, private persons within the social self.
Our social consciousness and the rich coramunipability we enjoy
with other persons attests this truth.
With this interpretation ox things we view stualities
of personality as perhaps understood more fully as in the
natural social life than as that which is more narrowly in-
dividual. In fact it is truly personal ±u marking off one
person from all others. Temperament for example makes up what
may be called the 3um total of "social reflex actions".
(13)
"It is just your typical bearing towards your fellows."
Thus a great philosopher when he gives to the world the results
of his deepest insights, in what constitutes his 'system' of
reality but interprets the inner attitudes and characteristics
of his o:vn age, and social environment,
T YPiiS 0? COI£!Ui:iTY
The Family
Of all commuiiities of persons, the fa.nily, the home
circle, is the most iiiimeliate ana should be uhe closest ui^ion
of selves. In moderi^ times family uiiity has beex. subject to
all sorts of disrupting influences. Ijo longer does the
€
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solidarity of the patriarchal family oommunity hold individuals
united "by blood ties to each other. Moderii industrialism and
individualism have brought about the necessity of great changes
in che family relationship. 2oo often results of the changes
have been so revolutionary as go strike at the very roots of
moral selfhood and morality itself. Various and sometimes
fantastic have been suggested solutions of the situation.
In general though there are two ethical attitudes
in regard to the family as well as other social ties. One i©
that Iffe must use the law. Vie must legislate and so surround
each person with the imperative demands as to the right con-
duct, and punishments attending failure to conform. On the
other hand there is the formalistic vie^/vpoint, Those who main-
tain this attitude seek a dynamic principle which will work
from the inside and control and equalize all our ethical life.
The majority of philesophEBS seek some sort of synopsis of
these widely diverse attitudes,
Royce in ethics represents what is probably ohe uest
and most thorogoing recent statement of ohe formalistic viev/.
In regard to the family Joyce believes that it should lo more
than a mere relationship, of blood or society. 5uch a union
should be interpreted as a giving of ourselves loyally to its
cause, which involves the well-being of every participating
member. An individual alone can never be a complete cause, an
object of our whole loyalty, "llow, can our American people
learn this lesson in so far as this lesson is illustrated by
family ties? Can they come to Bee that loyalty does not mean
the exaltation of individuals to the rank of true personalities
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by virtue of their free acceptanoe of enduring causes, and
by virtue of their life long service in their comnon personal
ties? If this lesson can be learned by those serious-'ninded
people who have been misled, in recent times, by a false form
of individualism, "chen we shall indeed not get rid of our
moral problems, but we shall vastly simplify our moral sit-
(14)
uation.
"
The State
Eext to the kinship oonds which hold persons in
fellowship and mutual loyalty, are bonds which link x.hem with
everwidening and iniierlapping social circles. i!hese include
fraternities, trades unions, political organizations, and
nations. I will deal with only one and that rather briefly.
This will be the state or nation. In many ways we have an
outstanding illustration of a community which possesses or
seems to possess an actual selfhood, Nations have ever, when
at their best, been more than simply a group of persons bound
together by race and geographical conditions. In times of
peace they have been able to advance or retrogress as a whole.
In times of war they have been able to rise as one man and
struggle for ideals that are dear to the common heart. Many
nations today are made up of loyal, devoted persons who are
intensly patriotic.
In America with all our bitter factionalisms, and
amidst the bewilderment of political movements we are maae
to wonder if there is much genuine patriotism left. .Yet the
outlook is more hopeful as we look at the larger interests
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that are fusing us into a finer ujiity. "',/e need and we are "be-
ginning to get a new and wiser provincialism." This is being
manifested in the expression of public spiritedness in a common
education, and adornment of thaz which is its own. It is a spirit
which "shows itself in the multiplying of public liuraries, in
the laying of public parks, in the work of local historical as-
(16)
aociations. " Numberless are its manifestations, but in each
case there are new and wider forms of loyalty to ideals.
There is much being said today with regard to the
common brotherhood of man, of internationalism; that which Hoyce
calls the Great Community. Many (speculative) conjectures by
dreamers or by genuine idealists as the case may be, have been
made. The one predominating consideration is that closer world
relationships are the heritage of this age, more that any
previous one. Means of communication and the breakdown of
many former sociological and psychological barriers bring the
nations into very close touch with each other. It is a wonder,
at least, if perhaps we are not on the verge of a closer art-
iculation of ohe people of the world than ever before. What-
ever comes and certainly international fellowship is highly
desirable, it is not desirable that the nations lose their
separate identities. '*The distinct national uiiities must remain
intact, each with its own internal motives for loyalty and with
its own modes of expression whereby the loyalty of its ind-
ividual citizens will be won and sustained in the community of
(17)
mankind ,
"
I
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The Church Invisible
Idealism, though often criticized as fanciful and
impractical, strikes upon a fundamental truth in making
spiritual the "basis of any union of souls or persons. It takes
only a superficial ohservation of history to cause us to admit
that real and lasting union can never be hoped for by merely
political means. It is just as true for a large as a small
group, and we cannot hope for international unity and peace
through merely external opganization. Any bond that will ac-
tually hold must be a spiritual bond. They must be linked with
the deepest ideal to which we may devote ourselves.
This unseen kingdom, this invisible church is no new
idea, but has burned in the hearts of visionaries and seers as
long as men have had ideals at all. It was through her spirit-
ual power (for she never obtained political unity and power),
that Greece can truly be said to rule the world. It is also
in the invisible realm that Hebrew and Christian thought has
so impressed their stamp upon our western civilization. That
Zion, the new Jerusalem, will triumph is the hope not merely of
the prophets of old but in some measure of every one of us.
That we are one of the 'faithful' actuates men not alone to
deeds of narrow devotion to some exclusive interest or cause
but to a whole-wouled loyalty to intersts that embrace all the
world, that encompasses humanity.
Personally, I cannot feel that the practical manner
of effecting international brotherhood suggested by Royce is
adequate. It is through international insurance. His main ap-
peal is that any insurance is attended along with its direct
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"benefits by many indireot affects. I'hese are types ox social
linkages which lie beneath the surface but do much to build
up bonds of intercourse and understanding. Applied to the
world, and nations then, perhaps a cementing of relations would
occur. Yet we can but wonder how far insurance in the
multitude of other agencies has actually contributed to the
social strength and solidarity of any nation. It seems too
slim a hope to pin so much to. Yet we must not criticize
unless we cann offer to provide something better. There is no
doubt that plan was consistently presented. Hot only that but
there is no doubt that Hoyce felt with and labored for the
highest and deepest interests of humanity. Y/hile the plans he
advocated seemed too visionary and over-idealistec
,
anyone can
feel breathed into his books an intense love for all men, and
an unflinching loyalty to truth. "To him the great ultimate
questions were not simply interesting scientific problems
that challenged his intellect, they were also matters of in-
tensely practical import ior the spiritual quickening of his
(lb)
fellows. '»
While Royce thus had a genuinely human interest in
his work, he would not be fully entitled to the title of true
philosopher without building his thought into a significant
metaphysical system. This he has admirably accomplished. Yet
his Metaphysics means more against the background of his own
personal interest in all the concerns of life and not the
speculative exclusively. We can now take up the study of
the metaphysical relationships of personality as he viewed
them.

GHAPTiS III
METAPHYSICAL

TH'ii MiSTAPHYSIGAl Si31i^
Place of the Self in the Theory of Reality
The World of Reality for Royce is of such stuff as
that of which ideas are made. Like Berkeley, he knows noth-
ing whatever "beyond experience. Briefly stated; Being,
Reality,- as far as we know it empirically, is made up of
the World of Lescription and the V/orld of Appreciation.
The World of Lescription includes all data having univer-
sality; all categorized experience, and the physically real.
In faojr, it comprises the whole outer describaule order. With-
in which scientific theory seeks to harmonize and systematize
the facte of the universe. The world of appreciation of the
other hand, is the woild known^mmediately to the self. It is
of an inner nature and comes in fleeting momentary glimpses.
Yet ultimately this world of appreciated content is the basis
of all fact, r.'e can describe only that which we first appre-
ciated and understand. This then, being true, such a world
would not be mechanistic in a naturalistic sense at all. For,
(1)
while it is describable by such terms as the "well-knit", the
"orderly", and while it conforms to law, at the same time it
is basically ideal. Our description takes the form of univer-
sal types of appreciation, i.e., ideals.
There comes at once with the statement of such a pro
gram the* charge of solipsism. If the world is to be described
in mental terms, then c.he self necessarily is going to ue
central in importance. At the outset of critical philosophic
study and search to know objective truth, and the relationship
the human self bears to it, an unnamed I, a self without the
t
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countless relationships acquired by experience, must be
dealt wit^. The difficulty is met by considering this simple
self, this mere individual, as but the starting point of the
search for the true self. Fichte viewed the self (das Ich)
not merelyas given but as an unkno^vn quantity to be fathomed,
and so Royce views it. For him, solipsistic methods are simply
useful pedagogical devices to introduce us to "Che issues of
metaphysics. i?he priority of the self, the individual, in
post Kantian idealistic thought saves it from solipsism, So
the self being the starting place must be defined. "First
then, to say I clearly know myself, but I know not certainly
anything beyond myself, and then by analysis to reduce the out-
er world to my idea, and then to say beyond my idea I can never
certainly go,- all this method of provisional and halting
refledtion, which assumes the ego as something perfectly trans-
parent, may be useful enough as a propaedeutic to philosophy.
(3)
It is not yet thoroughgoing self-criticism."
The Self has often been defined as the knower of
present experiences. This coramen philosophical definition puts
extreme limitations on the self. Kot only that but it is nec-
cessary to understand the exact significance of the expression.
In the first place, according to Hoyce and idealism at large,
we know only what is in consciousness;- current ideas, feelings,
thoughts, and ourselves for whom all these things are
momentary. "As for myself, I know myself Just as the ki.ower
of these current thoughts of this momeno." ihe present moment
too
,
Hoyce shows further, is something that is hard to define
as to deration or as to fullness. I. cannot know and understand
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in full what is presented to me, nor what and who I, the
knower of -the present momentary faot, really am, for too <iUick-
ly it becomes past knowledge. "My momenta as such have no power
to define in any sharp fashion their o\7n content." This can
only he disclosed hy reflection. But in our finite experience
full and immediate are never present together. At the same
time the self is much more than the mere self of the moment.
In one momentary flash of consciousness the self can never know
who he is at that moment ,or but little of its meaning. "It is
of his very essence to appeal beyond the moment to a ;)ustly
reflective self, who can discover and so reflectively determine
(6)
who he is,'' Just at the fringe of all that occupies our
consciousness at the moment, is a more vague consciousness of
all our past experiences, of the kriowledge of reality we have
gained. Through a variety of linkages of such facts we are bound
up with the whole world, we are in touch with the Infinite.
Before taking up the actual implications of Seli-
consciousness seek to know the relationships by which we are in
touch with the wider v/orld of infinite reality, it will be well
to consider the fact-linkages by which we know our worla.
Reflection upon the so-called world of fact is made by means
of various categories. The principSii categories are those of
Likeness and Llfference, as Hoyce has it, Hhese somewhat con-
tradictory categories basically are at oneness. For all dif-
ferences, as truly as likenesses, are based upon tmderlying
similarities. Unless there is a unified background, differences
mean nothing. Objects of like and dislike hinge upon our
interest, and its degree, and upon our intention to study
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them. Consequently they are very deeply linked with our
purposes.
This brings facts to a more personal status. Going
further ue would see that concrete acts of Imowledge are ab-
stractions of some phase or element from the rest of the world
for their clarity. 'Things' do not exist independently; in
knowing any one concrete object we in a sense know all. Our
whole knowledge is so interrelated that y/hatever is uiikiiOv/n
is so because of our inattention to it, For whatever we are
interested in and actually attend to, we m«ike real to ourselves.
Classification of facts, even in a science, is made according
to our interest; and for truth and validity, depend upon the
will which formed them. They are true in so far as our will,
in stating them is in accord v/ith the Absolute will.
V/e could say that when we are thus linked with final
reality that all real facts are present in the "undifferentiated
(7)
background of our present consciousness.'* Yet in the category
of the world of description we must stubbornly limit ourselves.
It is only thus that we havebeen able to push aside the great
m.ass of world fact and create our sciences. The categories
of delation serve to link and make coherent all the objects of
our interests; but discrimination, bhat is at the very root of
self-consciousness helps us to abstract again that which should
be abstracted.
Implications of the Self-Gfonsciousness
We know after all but little of the ego itself. Its
experience we know, and we know it as our ov/n experience. I'he
I
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nigo we also know as the sulijeot of this ezperience, out Tihat
is not very conolusive knowledge and not zhe end of ohe matter.
The implications of such a self-oonsoiousness are very wide
and despite its seeming 'to oe paradoxical mean much more lihan
contained in the moment. "The self, then, is not yet known
to us except as the problematic truth exemplified by the still
(8)
so mysterious fact of the oogito itself.'* uHoyce would have
the ergo sum to come only because we read more into simple a
priori existence oi the self, than its meaning in itself.
Already we have the outline of the theoryof reality and the
part the self plays through its experience. ITow to get a bet-
ter view of the self in its fulness it must be set over against
the world that it experiences, or better that it can experience.
First of all, we attach the Internal Meaning uhat
ideas have for us mainly by an empirical process. In a fuller
sense it can be said that no man has ever nor can he ever
actually verify 'human experience' in a oroad conception of it.
This leads to a very natural distinction of facts oetween tne
empirically accessable, seen in observable facts; and in-
accessable, unseen and transcendent facts. Despite the truth
this contains, -ioyce prefers a simpler distinction by which he
follows out the 'logical implications of self-consciousness'.
This distinction he makes as follows, i'irst there are the
present experiences of one man. Second the totality of facts
experienced by various men; as, that of the carpenter, poet,
student
,
Of course no fact is accredited by us unless it
becomes our individual experience. Yet this leaves a vast
/
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number of unaccredited facts. An accredited fact means one
accredited fcj my present momentary experience. But we cannot
even fully tell all that -76 are conscious of in any one moment.
Besides v/hat is in the foreground at the top of consciousness
there is always a deep "backgrround. We know only ihe foreground.
If we seek to lirace down and verify any thought or word we can
also verify the fact that we verify it, and so on (ad infinitum).
Otherwise we "consciously verify (in a moment) an infinity of
(9)
facts,'* which is impossible. I'his seems a new assurance of
the a priori existence of the ego.
While human experience means priraarxly facta verified
ty individual men there are numerous metempirical elements.
These are inseparably a part of us. Our experience although
more or less spasmodic and contradictory, by virtue of these
transcending elements point to a finally organized world ex-
perience, in which ours is but a fragmentary part. x'he trans-
ition from the empirical to the metempirical realm is usually
made too easily. Philosophy's goal should be a rational insight
into the transition. Such insis-ht should indicate less of a
gap to be bridged as is usually thoue^ht. At the first of the
study the t-vvo ars fused into simply the world of facts; but
with each presentation of new experience the self comes to see
its evcr increasing implications and with each added insight,
each appreciation is deeper, fuller of mefining, feels itself
as somehow transcending finiteness and seeking to know its
meaning in the Meaiiing of the V/hole,
Before we seek more fully to fathom the depth of
selfhood it v/ill be vvell to suggest briefly contrasting
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to the theory of reality whioh is held by ^^oyce. i'or Real-
ism selfhood as v7e have seen, is at basis some substantial
soul-stuff. To this lioyce objects that "you would gain noth-
ing but a name when this oDserved substratum of your person-
(10)
ality is called your soul, jTor ueing oeneath conscious-
ness it is not invested with will and meaning which ohe nature
of selfhood should possess. Mysticism for .toyce fails to meet
the great problems of reality. Its world, he thinks is too un-
real, too far removed from actual finite existence. Critical
iiationaliSQi is for him largely true, but its self is rather a
type of existence than an individual in the true sense of the
word. The truth it holds is in its recognition of the valid
relations of the self to the world and other selves, as necessa-
ry to its existence. Yet for Hoyce's close-knit mibnisra outside
of this, such a conception was to external to achieve the unity
he wanted.
For idealism, the self is a life of willing, choosing;
and possesses individuality. And individuality is not gained
because of the neceesity of man's relationship with the life
of the world, of God: but because the divine purpose is con-
sciously carried out. And the life of the Absolute is unified
because of the variety, the contrasts of our finite lives; as
our life plans attain statement and clear being Just to the
extent that they are mutually contrasted in social relatiox^s.
There caniiot be unity without diversity nor diversity without
unity. So then the true self is not a mere datum, but an
ideal. True selfhood begins upon the formation aiid growth of
an ideal which brings order and connectedness into the inner
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world. Our personal ideiitity as to 'who we are' we know but
as 3.0JQQ shows we do not know what we are. "w'e kiiov/ our self
and its meaning in and for itself, then, only by knowing the
whole nature of being.
At no moment oan we oe said to find the self but we
can define it in ideal terras. "Self is definable in terms of
purpose, of continuity of life plan, and of voluntary sub-
ordination of ohanoe experiences to a persistently emphasized
(11)
ideal.'' Too often we try to define the self by the fragment-
ary and disjointed empirical observations we can make of it.
Psychology would show us to have many selves, so if we hopeto
find any unity we caiinot take such scattered and single el-
ements of consciousness. Yet we can distinguish beneath, and
running through all such contradictory facts of life deeper
elements which unify the self, and link it ultimately to the
whole 01 oeing, all that is.
ihe true place of the self is in the eternal xiealm.
All the attributes of selfhood that meci-n anything, as we have
see^i, are stated in terns of natural or social relationships,
and these in turn are but indications of the all-inclusive
life of God, or of the Absolute. In all our dependence upon
heredity, social training, contrasts that are literal or
ideal, what we want for the self, for ourselves, is "conscious
meaning, conscious individuality, and conscious freedom."
We are dependent upon nature and other selves in every-
thing but the uniqueness of the design of our own lives, which
in turn has full meaning because it is a function of a larger
life, '*Ve derive fron nature and society in the self, everything
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except its "individual fashion of acknowledging and taking
interest in this its very dependence and of responding thereto
(IS)
by its deeds." ^ch of us has his own place in the world,
and we only can fill it and thereby consciously express God's
will. I am» then, "just mt conscious intent to be, in God's
(14)
world, myself and nobflidy else.
"
Personal Identity Preeminently ethical
In the following of Hoyoe's thought in regard to per-
sonality thus far, we have traced the empirical growth of the
self-consciousness under strictly social conditions and re-
ferred it to its metaphysical setting, V/e will now look more
into what actually constitutes the true nature of the selfhood.
The very essence of the personality, of a rationally developed
self-consciousness is in its purposiveness, its oujrhtness.
Whatever else a person is, he is fundamentally an ethical being.
His invariable character istios are a wide rango of selfdirected
activity, and the power of choice. And despite its seeming in-
congruity at. first, as we follow ohe fortuiies of personality, we
come to see chat purpose, reasonauleness, is also stamped on the
very nature of the universe itself.
Facts are after all simply other than the results of
the willing activity, in that it does not actually produce
them. They are indeed foreign to the will and are stULOorn,
persistent things and seem to determine our lives. Yet very
early consciousness begins to enquire, recognizes its own mys-
teries and is not so much the pas'-^ive victim of circumstances
as to many it appears. Hot only do we seek to uiiderstand facts
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that directly concern us or that are pushed upon us hut we
like to enquire into more remote regions as mathmatics,
astronomy, theology. It is of the very nature of our human
consciousness to constantly push tack its horizons, and to
enlarge its relationships and its kinships. And while it
may he that "because of the necessities of environing influences
and hereditary elements, we are in a measure predestined to be
as we are, yet will "always cooperate in izs own compulsions.'*
So in a sense, "what we experience is always our own will
(15)
to oe compelled hy the facts."
Usually analysis makes clear that facts are but a
"synthesis of their so-called stubborn or foreign character
with their e^iually genuine .character as expressions of a
(16)
purpose." The acknowledgement of a fact comes when some
action is attempted, and the fact is found to be present either
to thwart or to further the action. These actions while imder
a limited will and capacity imply a more perfect action and
experience, and hence the world of reality. We do not at first
recognize an objective world as prior to our knowing it, but
it is simply what it is because the conscious process means by
it the necessary response, V/hat we recognize as the thing we
ought to do, the consciousness of the mere rational purpose,
stands out above our changeable will and momentary activity.
This ou^ht, called the Practical ought oi lithics, is not actual-
ly foreign to our .vills and purposes but is what we are trying
to mean. Carried out it becomes the Theoretical Ought which
finds its embodiment in ohe world of perfect will, the world
of facts, "The facts as real, are emboairaents of my purpose,
i
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yet not ray purpose as it just now transcendently seema, but
(17)
as it ought to Le viewed," Therefore every ooncret© act
would oecome the expression of a purpose.
Will, The Basic Characteristic of Self-Conscious Person
It now seems q.uite clear that at the basis of our
recognition of the Ought, is to be found true reality and that
it embodies purpose. Heasonablenesa would then involve fulfill-
ing purpose. This is akin to saying that reality must fully be
in accord with reason. For if ought is anything it is primar-
ily a principle which determines the acknowledpring as real or
true a certain system in preference to another one. If then
we acknowledg-e a certain ought as binding we are faced with
the necessity of choice.
V/e are accustomed oo emphasize che restraints uxDon
will because, and in our finiteness they are subject to time
categories; and che invariableness of ohe laws oi ohe world of
description. The Logos or V/orld-V/ill consoitutes, on whe other
hand, uhe all comprehending, ohe eternally existing world of
appreciation. Only occasionally do we get a uriei insight into
this infinite realm. iVhen we do it is noc to understand cause
in any narrow sense, but glimpse freedom itself. We see this
World-V/ill carrying out the acts of his own choosing but not
without or beyond reason.
The moral order is real only because the Absolute
knows it to be as it is and wills that every finite element,
everything having to lo with our individuality is the fulfilment
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of his purpose. This could ue best aooomplished through our
individual freedom and under the limitations of the time order.
Ou^ht belongs to a time order, knowing the idea of present and
future upon the background of past. We consider some course,
make a present decision and follov/ it by action.V/ith the Ab-
solute it is not thus. To him past, present, and future are
represented as a totality. Just as we can think of a melody
in its entirety so the Absolute views the whole of being.
Furthermore to carry the figure farther, che melody musL come
to us a noce at a time; yet each note has meaning only in re-
lation no the whole. Jus o so in the separate acts of oar lives.
Each is separate and distinct to its moment of conaciousness
and each has its own will so to speak; yet altogether they make
up our unified life.
SOME PiiOBimiS
Problem of iiebellion
Some very knotty problems arise at this point. If we
are subject to a genuine ought and this ought is opposed by
some rebellious person, is not the absolute purpose in that
instance thwarted? Can ought and ought not occur together?
The way Hoyce gets out of this difficulty seema to me somewhat
far fetched, but is nevertheless clever. Beginning with its
Internal meaning, by which the self designates itself as dif-
ferent, it seeks to express itself more truly and fully in
willing. This may be either in an actual effort to discover
the true world-will, the .ilxternal meaning, or it may be in
rebellion. In either case aelf-expression is ohe goal, and
f
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that in a form different from what it recognizes its inner life
to possess. A self in rebelling seeks to subdue all "being to
its caprioe; "but thus illustrates that God's spirit is expressing
itself even thus unwillingly through the agent. So, then, in
evil or rebellion a particular phase or interest of being is
being wrought out that oould be in no other way. Yet doubtless
absolute will is worked out much more fully through the obed-
ient will, Retarding elements serve only to strengthen him.
Just as in our lives temptation and conquest make for character
so it takes every such element to make perfebt the Absolute will
and experience.
Sin, Freedom
While it may be said, ( it could be neither proven nor
disproven) that one always wills finally the right thing
whether he intends to or not, a further question arises. Can
a self knowing the Ought choose to conform or not to conform
to it? In other words are we actually free? It has been pre-
sented before in other relations that the unique elements that
a self possesses, in being itself and no other is the free ex-
pression of one fragment of the divine world-will. In other
words one's originality inheres in this fact, and as we achieve
a fuller and deeper insight into the mysteries, the implications
of our existence, so much the better can we express not only
world-vvill but our own true will as selves as well.
The direction of our lives as free persons, the field
of our choices becomes physiologically thw field of attention.
Bvery deed of our lives is "an act of knowledge and ax. ex-
c9
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(lb)
pression of purpose,- an insight and a choice. " Yet
knowledge and will are but different aspeota of our conscious
life. Attention alternates our present knowledge to suit a
purpose, "but after all, we act only in the light of our pres-
ent knowledge, When we widen our outlook upon life, and "broaden
our cnnsciousness to comprehend all we can or truth,- then we
are truly moral.' On the other hand when we narrow our conscious-
ness, so ignoring what we know of truth and value, then we sin.
Finally in its essence "moral freedom is simply this freedom tio
hold by attention, or to forget by inattention, an Ought al-
(19)
ready present to one's finite consciousness."
In this same coniiection it would be well to sketch at
least, briefly, xioyce's thought with regard to optimism ana
pessimism. Idealists have been accused of shutting thair eyes
to actual realities when they were unpleasant or evil, to be
free to present their scheme of things. It is not so v;hith
Royce. He rather vindicates the actual being of the darker el-
ements of reality as necessary to the best possible nature of
the whole. Doubt, honest doubt, is in a deeper sense reaction
against vain show and an acknov/ledgement of deeper reality and
truth. Sorrow is not so much a deplorable condition of human
misery as a condition in which can be had one of the deepest
of true iKsights into life's real mearjing. Sinfulness and all
the weaknesses our finiteness knows, serves in God or man, in
this view, not as a hampering force but as one which niahes
possible true perfection. So it is unjustifiable to refuse to
see life's realities as they are. but it is still less in
c
accord with rational, personal understanding to "be defeated
by life's vicissitudes and hardships. "The only optimism
worthy of a brave man is that which recogiiizes sin and evil
as a part of uhe real world, and yet wills thai, these should
"be overcome, with a faith that the Infinite iipirit ujjon whom
the world depends is rational,"
LOYALTY
Ifature
In our study of che social nature of the self we
have seen something of the nature of loyalty, ITow we will
seek to knoiv of its metaphysical connection with personality,
"A self is a life in so far as it is unified "by a single pur-
pose. Our loyalties furnish such purposes, and hence make of
us conscious and unified moral persons . Loyalty brings
(ai)
the individual to full moral self-consciousness." The
very basis of conscious reality, as we have seen, is ethical.
The power of choice, of discrimination is essential to any
development of self-consciousness and its entailed moral re-
sponsibility. This is however simply stating the condition
of necessity under which personality forms and noo any sugges
tion as to how it is accomplished.
There must ue a motive force, which gives direcoion
to our life of choice, Whether we emphasiije compulsion from
without or trust to final means there must ue a dyi^amic in-
fluence operating or no progress will De made. In Christian
ethics the central dynamic is love. In the teaching of Kant
it was the good-will, and for I^oyce it is simply loyalty.
I1
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This doctrine seems to obviate "Uhe dif fioultiec of
many of che other ethical theories. It oixix be characterized
by the "double front" title:- the common good. Duty is
common and possesses imperative force probably equalled by
no other principle. Yet it may be far from the doer's good.
Self-realization on the other hand about which we hear so much
and see so little, would doubtless be for the doer's good.
Yet it might not be for an7/one else's good. Loyalty is good,
or contributes to the good, first simply as a personal attitude.
And second it is a common good in that it unifies persons by
devotion to a common cause.
This use of loyalty just explained is central in
ethical theory. There is another and a more metaphysical
application oi the principle. "Loyalty ajjpears to ua not
only as a guide of life but as a revelation of our relation to
a realm which we have been obliged to define as one eternal and
all embracing unity of spiritual life.
"
Loyalty to Loyalty Makes Unity
Loyalty as used by _^oyce serves tv/o large purposes
as we suggested. First of all we will deal with Its use in
ethical theory. The first question which arises when loyalty
is given as the guide to the moral life is as co what cause
we shoula serve. It is not aifficult co tnink ox countless
conflicts in causes that in themselves have good and sufficient
reason for loyal devotion. Illustrations might Le listed of
political issues, national policies, religious ueliefs, as well
as personal interests, Furthermore loyalty is of worth oo the
(i
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loyal only when it is the interests of a freely chosen ca,use.
And "there is only one way to oe an ethioal individual. That
is to choose your cause, and then serve it, as the Samurai
his feudal ohief , as the ideal knight of romantic story his
lady, in the spirit of the loyal. '* But when in a social
conflict which is ever a conflict of loyalties, a destructive
result is brought ahout the lof^ser is deprived of his cause
and spirit of devotedness. To fret out of this difficulty a
cause must "be conceived that carried out to "Uhe end is ennobling
to the loyal person and does not deprive anyone of any ^ust
cause which claims devotion. Such a cause would oe good for
all mankind. It is what .i:oyce sees fit to call loyalty to
loyalty.
Hot only does loyalty imply a cause to which one may
give allegiance, but it implies a giving of one's self in a
cause. Y/ithout that it is Iju^ a name. Loyalty is actually a
good only steadfast sticking to purpose, but also saci-iiice and
suffering if need be. The most worthy causes have often been
unpopular. x'his is a favorite doctrine with lioyce. As he sees
it, loyalty is trained, is deepened by adversity and in Its
giving of self, the spirit of final triumph, it links men with
the spiritual realm. In carrying out this theme he incliiies to
pessim.ism. In his thinking there is no place for a far-off
Paradise of ease and freedom from work and conflict. father
through unceasing battle -rith evil and overcoming of temptation
we attain character and selfhood, and to him, the only
possible immortality.
•
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Universalizes Cause
Ik the first plaoe if one's moral salvation is to be
wrought out throuerh this principle there will be ^ew external
restrictions upon it. It in "no aris loctatic gii't of the few."
True-heart edness may as often be found with the humble as with
any other type of person. It is of the nature of good: of su-
preme and universal human good, "i'or iu is simply the finding
of a harmony of the self and the world, such a harmony as alone
can content any human being.
"
Thus the highest work we can do upon earth would be
to further loyalty among all men who are in truth our fellow-
servants, our brethren. This is noii to oe done by so making our
personal life-choices, by so making our course that we can fur-
ther universal lor^alty. Any effort which :7e can make which
results in our fellow-being made more loyal to noble causes that
they hold dear is practical, "To be humane, to be loyal to one's
own cause, and to respect a like loyalty ir others as a precious
and inviolable thing, 0 this was rie*ht conduct according to
id!)
Professor rioyce. '
The virtues, comraonpla.ce but ever desiratle, serve to
attain this supreme good. In truthfulness we are not only loyal
to truth ourselves but inspire our fillows with greater con-
fidence in mankind. Courtesy is shown as a loyal bearing to
others, "and helps everyone who either receives or witi^esses
couroesy to assume a loyal attitude uoward all the causes that
are represented by the peaceful and reasonaule dealings oi man
with man," as he expresses it.
t
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.Sxpresses the Dictates of Gonscieiice
Pioyce gives what seems to me his finest statement of the
philosophy of loyalty in the development of its application to
conscience. To define conscience we must have in mind just
what personality is. A person as we have seen, is a human life
lived in accordance with a plan. Much will depend upon the
hereditary and environinj? conditions in which one's life dev-
velops. Ee calls one's home and birth place the "purposeful
aspect of his personality."! And these will invariably ce an
index to one's social activities and standing, Purposiveness
comes thus to be the heart of personality. For if we are moved
by purpose, it will furnish a cause to v/hioh we will give firm
adherence and through v/hica our lives will have unity and fixity.
"It is devoting the self to a cause that, after all, first makes
it a rational ana. ui^ified self, instead ox wiiat the lifu oi too
many a man remains,- namely, a caular ox- oi seething and bubbling
efforts to be somebody, a cauldron which boils dry when life
(50)
ends. '
The idealist expresses the case truly when he shows
that moral personality has two phases. One is that it lives
a life, of alternating choice and activity. The other is that
as a moral person it has an ideal and ideals towards the
attainance of which life's energies are directed. And the fol-
lowing out of ideals give motivation to our lives. It furnishes
us with causes. But it is in the fact that they are beyond our
actual attainment. So there is aver a settling of actual life
over against the ideal of how it should be and we must judge
r
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and evaluate choices so they will best harmonize and work out.
Thus the causes that claim us come to form our conscience.
And conscience in turn consLitutes the ideal of moral pBrsonal-
ity; for it inspires and moulds to unii,y and finally achieves
development of a rational self, I^ot only is ix, the monitor of
each individual life, it also helps men x.o find their place in
the whole. "\^iewed as something within myself, my conscience
is the spirit of the self, first moving on the face of the waters
of natural desire, and then gradually creating the heavens and
(31)
the earth of this life of the individual man.
"
In accordance, then, with the whole ethical and meta-
physical theory, it should be added that the conscience would
not be some innate influence. It is most diverse in its man-
ifestation, and more or less raynterious, Yet it, the result of
growth and education,- it becomes the flower of the moral life.
As the personality is enlarged, the conscience in so far as it
has been given a place, lends strength and steadfastness to the
moral life.
Interpretation of Christian Love
A discussion of loyalty sould not Le complete without
some reference to that other formalisiio principle which it ao
closely resembles. I.e., Christian love. I'he current of
Christian thought and feeling like a golden stream in its flow
down through the ages has orougnt enrichment not only in a
direct influence on lives but finds its way into every phase of
speculative thought and interest. V*e see it recurrently in the
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applications Hoyce makes of Christian teachings. In turn he
gives these conceptions the impress of his originality of thought
and feeling. Two outstanding themes constitute the incentive
for the thought of Hoyce in this regard. ?irst is his in-cer-
pretation of Christianity and Buddhism, and second^s in the
view he holds of the historical setting of Christianity. I'here
are others no doubt, hut these attitudes he expressed throws
some light on his conception of personality, ihese might brief-
ly be termed; emphasis on the individual, and loyalty to lost
causes.
In comparing Christianity and Buddhism Koyce shows
that the essential difference is one of emphasis on the ind-
dividual. Buddhism tends to seek its extinction, while Christ-
ianity considers it of infinite value and worth, "of worth-',
he shows, "because the Father loves Him." Christianity is
majestically Jnique because of this conception. To Royce the
love of God for the individual is "for one whose destiny is
to be a member of the kJinp-dom of heaven, essentially a
community," Man's original sin, he believes is in being
detached from this community, and his salvatioii is accom-
plished by being reinstated into it. Hence it is that love
of the individual recuprocated to his God, gets to be hia de-
votion to his "creauive office as a loyal memuer of a beloved
community, " In carrying out this concep uion the idea of
atonement is a favorite one with Hoyoe, i'o him it ia more
than the reconciliation of good and evil through uhe genius of
creative love, so he is not in sympathy wit^ the theological

56
treataent of the subject. "Let no eviljbe done," he says, "so
deep in its treadhery that creative love shall find the way to
make the world better than it would have been had that evil
deed not been done. '
The other theme developed by Hoyce attributes the
rise and spread of early Christianity to loyalty to lost causes,,
and the subsequent tenacity of personal devotedness that aver
entails. In the first place he shows that whereas the unity
attained in Israel imder David and Solomon was lost after a short
time, that it survived as an ideal. This lost ideal formed the
burden of the prophetic message, and the ideal of the univer-
sal kingdom of righterousness was evolved. "And so through a
historical process, every step of which depended upon a pa-
thetic and yet glorious loyalty to a lost national cause, the
ideals in siuestion were at once universalized and intensified
until, through Israel, all t^e nations of Christendom have
been olessed." i'his same idea applied to the early Chris-
tians, who when their Lord was crucified, ana they were forced
to meen ridicule and even social ostracism yet v/ity the increase
of suffering for their ideals, these v/ere intensified and
their loyalty became a living power.
He disparages unduly the place of Jesus. "The pic-
ture of Jesus as presented in the Gospels, the picture of a
particulat individual embodying a definite ideal of service
and brotherhood and love, finds no natural place in his phil-
osophy, "All we can hope for is an ap'proximation toward that
(34)
ideal, to be realized in the eternal." This idea will
have fuller treatment in the next section.

•CHAPTi::^ IV
FULFIUvliltTT IN TH3 ABSOLUTE
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FULS'ILI.MT IN TH5 ABSOLUT iS
Theory of Human Ignorance
jBarlier in this paper in dealing especially Mlth the
empirical development of personality there was considerable
occasion to stress the fragmentariness , the essentially incom-
plete character of our human personalities, ilow some of the
same or similar facts will be referred to, but in com^ection
with meaning which taken as they come, are not seen to possess.
Yet viewing such facts of life in their entirety and also in
response to the social and ethical demands of personality itself,
all this incompleteness of human ways and knowledge implies and
requires fulfilment. A little study into the nature of our hu-
man insufficiency as it is asscorapared with what it might be
or wants to be would give a basis for a better understanding.
V/e hear m.uch about theories of human knowledge, but
they night almost cs well be called theories oi human ignor-
ance. 'Jhen we think pf the constant enlargement of loiowledge
which can be appreciated, and the wealth of v/orld truths we
can but realize that any one cheory or one outlook ppon truth
can not do it justice. Knowledge comes to us, not in wholes,
but in isolated sections. "I fully agree and insist that hu-
man kiiowledge is an island in the vtiS"^ ocean of mystery, and
thajfnumberless questions, which it deeply concerns humanity
to answer will never be answered so long as we are in our
present limited state, bound to one planet, left for our ex-
perience to our senses, our emotions, and our moral activi-
(1)
ties."
]?rom the standpoint of mere quantity, human knowledge
c•
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is of enormous proportions. Libraries, the press, 'che cause
of eduotition more specifically as such, all attest this. Yet
this is an external view only and completely ignoring the deep-
er inner attitudes, V/hat we want to see is a more personal
vie^ffpoint of it. As an example, take che works of a great
writer, in literature, liistory, philosophy, or science. Many
of them wrote voluminously,- Shakespeare's complete works,
Hee-el's close packed eighteen volumes, Hoyce mentions a prom-
inent iSnglish philosopher whose works side by side covered imo
feet of shelf room. But no one has yet nearly encompassed
human knowledge. V/e can look oack upon those who labored,
(many of them with every phase of reality) and think of them
now as representing perhaps much of true insight, but at best
they were limited. They were limited by personal weakness, and
predispositions; limited by the age in which they lived and
labored. Hot only have philosophers and historians been able
to express much of actual knowledge of the world but others
have felt the same limitations. IIo poet has yet wrote just as
he wished to. IJo artist or musician has quite giveii expression
to all his feelings or visions, llo state has ever founded any
enduring political or social order.
J'inite lack and Dissatisfaction
Most every person is conscious of liniteness. Some
misguided individuals ignore any reflection of this state at
at all and let the world go by with dull, uninterested com-
placency. For them life is a vain empty round mainly of
physical activity, a few seem to believe that they hare
ft
1
59
attained human perfection, and usually through a supreme
trust in their o^m reason, feel entirely self-conBistent
.
The most of mankind, however, feel the lack that human flesh
is heir to and are dissatisfied.
To quench this feeling of unsatisfied unworthiness
men have tried everything, Salvation is promised in numberless
ways, vVe will now consider one of the more practical outlets
which this longing of the human person to know and to ue orue,
to be genuine takes. We will follow out into the general realm
of science to find an illustration.
Despite the boasts of some of its misguided devotees
science never achieves more than a fragmentary statement of
knowledge. At the same time its very attitude of constant and
painstaking quest, presupposes a world that is orderly and com-
plete at its end, f^cience realy posits a world of phenonenal
truth over against a background of uncertainty and ignorance.
Upon thought then science has its ideals, and they are force-
driving ideals, more than any other realm. Just because science
deals with the so-called physical sorld and uses external and
indirect means of conveying its truths, it is none the lest
highly actuated by ideals. In fact much of even more modern
scientific thought sounds very like it was about some Platonic
world of ideas rather than some real world. Does it not
earnestly seek to verify the reality of atoms and protons, ether-
waves, evolutionary processes, mathmatical changes and like
abstract ideal conceptions? And none of these aru present to
actual sense experience. They later to make actual facts con-
form to uheir ideal.
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Always this world Just out of reach of Boientific
men is a world of organized experience. In theology of meta-
physics this might Qe the realm of the 'unknowable' but not so
in science; at least every possible means is going to be used
to make it kno^vn empirically. It is going to be the basis of
contrast and then an incentive to progress. 'Because you are
indirectly assured of the truth of an insight that you cannot
directly share you accuse your direct experience of illusory
(a)
fragmentariness . " And the very fragmentariness of it impels
us to seek that which is perfect and entire,
FIIIITiS LiiCK ANt IISS^TISj^AGTIOK
Human Ignorance Implies the Absolute
As we view the self in a contrast of its highest
attainments and its own desired possibilities, it is of nec-
cessitji implied that there must Le a fulfillment somewhere.
It is undoubtedly seeking eonsciously and unconsciously, too,
such a fulfullment. "When hetxioyce) asserts Lhe existence of
an all-comprehending mind it was not a probaule hypothesis,
but a necessity of thought, implied in every act of judgment,
(3)
even in our errors."
We have seen that self-consciousness is effected by
the contrasts, and contrasts which sometimes seem to retard
and even defeat. Later we sav/ hos unity and harmony is brought
about by adherence to life purpo?;es. That a self is in its
basic nature porposive, and that it moves under compunction of
the Ought, gives it its internal meaning. Then because it
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seeks expression outside its own finite limitations implies
an external meaning. Then "through attention to the life-
plan selecten as the Ideal, the Self partly realizes his self-
(4)
hood and requires the Absolute for fulfillment." As all
the contrasting elements, acts, choices, and the like make the
whole of tih© life of oneself, so the diverse and contrasting
human selves make up the A"bsolute Self. It is then a uiiity be-
cause of the diversity V7hich constitutes its actual being. I.iy
life plan then is the fulfillment in its contrasts to the other
elements, its place in the uiiity of the whole, and in thus
doing so to find actual completion. Therefore ''the life of God
is a system of contrasted lives, for variety is the best way
(5)
in which unity of meaning may be effected.
"
Doubt Implies the Absolute
I'ot only does human ignorance proclaim the being of
God and the unseei: world but doubt itself does the same.
Loubt and agnosticism express after a negative pessimistic
manner of course, the truth that the phenomenal world is but
vain and empty. Idealism enters and gives a positive doctrine
that there is a real world but it is the real world of spirit.
The world as it exists externally is the world of a universal
mind. There must be a Logos to convey inner intelligibility
which we feel but cannot describe in appreciation. In the act
simply of believing what a person says, or of accepting some
historical fact, of when we Deli eve our senses even, we tran-
scend our present selves and thus relate ourselves to truth.

6^
If we admit the power of ideals at all we will be faced with a
dilirama, Either we must say that the world is a v/ofld of ideas,
for with Berkeley only ideas are like ideas, iu other words it
is only |»y the spirit that we can kixow the things of the spirit;
or we must choose the other horn of the dilemma which would have
everything external as unknowable. The later position would be
beyond finite reach. The procedure of scepticism is usually to
deny any world of iddas, or any real world at all except such
as can be absolutely demonstrated in experience. Thus they
would admit only fragmentary experience and in no v/ise conplete-
ly organized nor is it a unity. "If every reality has to
exist just in so far as there is experience of ios existence,
then the determination of the world of experience to be this
world and no other, the fact that reality contains no other
facts than these, is, as the supposed final reality, itself
the object of one experience, for which the ^ragmentariness of
the finite world appears as a presented ai.a. absolute fi^ct,
beyond which no reality is to be viewed as genuinely possible
(6)
in brief it becomes an absolute experience."
KATURE OP ABSOIUTE SELi^
His Selfhood, a Fulfillment of Finite Selfhood
Y/e have made numerous references to the Absolute but
in various relations and so fragraentarily that it would ue well
at least briefly to summarise the facts in regard to his nature.
The Absolute in Joyce's thought is not a far-off
separated, incomprehensible being. Instead of that, he is
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immediate to us as finite persons, for his very beinp: compre-
hends us. We think teoause we are in his thought, v/e will as
expressions of his will. So every act of our lives, every human
life, then, has its meaning in the iibsolute life. By each
contrasting life he is m.ade complete; and they because of his
completeness, his perfection, our lack is supplemented,- v;e are
made perfect. "As sharers in that divine life, the selves, froip
the eternal standpoint, consciously attain their perfection by
the knowledge of their temporal strivings in their wholeness,
and by beholding their fragmentary meanings as fulfillments
(70
in the Absolute.
"
Hence the Absolute has Self-consciouness ; - this being
the necessary result of the contrasting selves which make up
his nature. Further, he in that he is including us as selves,
includes us as all as seer and knower of our experience aiid of
bur thought.
The Absolute Constitutes Supreme Meaning
-Tirst of all in actually satisfying the deepest hopes
and desires of finite selves, the Absolute constitutes what
they actually mean. He is ultimate reality. In him the striv-
ings of the personal coi.sciousixess finds explanation. He dis-
closes himself in Lux the rarest moments of reflective self-
consciousness, in moments of insight. x'hus error, which is
but shortsighted, blunderiiig, puts oi^e in a real relation to
tButh for although poorly expressed, there is a desire to know
true meaning. So it is especially in uhe act of belief, of
faith in some eternal truth, we transcend our present selves
I
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and relate ourselves to truth, "and this real relation is of
such a curious nature," iioyce poinos out, "that only a larger
inclusive self which consciously post:essed the object which
Mb)
I mean, could know or >erasp the reality of the relation.
No mere foreign and far-off God, then, would quite satisfy
this demand.
In the finitude of our limited personal grasp of
truth, we make countless errors. Our notions of objective
truth are faulty. But although we come short, the true self
of which we are an organic part has a deeper insight and sees
these oLjests that are external to us, as our ideas and that
nothing really exists apart from the really intended meaning,
"My finite self is an organic element in the correcting in-
sight of the xrue Self.
"
Absolute is Complete Thought
liot only is the ultimate meaning that we intend, to
be found in the Absolute; but in him and through him also is
to be found the perfection of our thought. V/ith the highest
development ot which our rational powers are capable, there
is always a consciousness of somehov/ coming short of the goal.
Always too there is the possibility of error. "I find myself in
error therefore wheii a wider reach of consciousness reveals the
partial character of a previous judgment; and I can conceive
the possibility of error even when as yet it has noo been thus
corrected, in terms of an ideal spectator whose renge of con-
sciousness shall include mine, along with whatever in addition
(10)
is necessary zo correct my one-sidedness. " How very little of
II
I
I
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ultimate truthi As we have seen, the idea as to a truth can
be understood only "by the idea of a vaster selv which includes
at the same time our thought and the object ox it. And there
could of course he but one such self.
We have come to this view offthe Absolute by first
taking the finite individual in the narrowest interpretation
we could conceive and gradually enlarging his personality and
noting its implications. And now we see in this our true self
one who knows what we mean even in our utmost confusion and
ignorance, He also is the great problem solver. xo him all
truth is clear and immediate in one eternal span of world-
thought .
vraile the span of our conscious apperception comprises
a most insignificant grasp of truth. His span of consciousness
compasses not oiily every question we could ask but sees with it
a full, detailed answer, The problems which wo perplex us are
problems because we are subject to time. \Vw know events as
coming in successive order but at the same time, Y/e constantly
transcend time by memory and imagination. In the m.emory ox a
melody or a rythm, or in any series of happenings we can view
in a moment what at the time of its presentation to us required
an extended period. Dime is but a convenient category and has
nothing to do with the actual reach of consciousness. A moment
which measures the apperception of certain mental relationships
while it can be measured by time, perhaps, but is not temporal;
in it we can join but a few remembered facts. On the other hana,
in a moments reflection we may have compressed the events of a
^ tl
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lifetime. "However small a bit of Self I am, I already then
possess something of the inclusive transoendency of the true
Self, for I 'look before and after' and join in my one oonscious-
ness more of time than the mathmatical instant would possess.
And as the moments of ray finite thought are to me when I re-
flect upon my own meaning, and upon the relations of many mo-
ments of ray life, so my neighbors and I are to this isrger Self,
when, discoursing together about the same oojeots, we find our-
(11)
selves as it were but moments in his inclusive unity.
"
The Absolute* and Evolution
In general it can be said that Hoyce accepts the
evolutionary hypothesis. Yet in qualifying many of its assump-
tions to conform to his theory introduces to say the least,
what is his o^vn interpretation.
He rejects at onee any idea of mind-stuff substance.
His whole philosophy is averse to any consideration of simple
isolated elements. If there is i^ot complete interrelationship
from the first to last there is not connected meaning. Hence
there cannot be a progressive growth out of Uiiconscious ma-
terial basis U13 to life and rationality. In every fact of
nature and of life there is an essentially spiritual basis.
The time rate of the processes, particularly of inorganic na-
ture are lower than our form of consciousness oan appreciate.
Man's li^e is continuous, through his being in the world Logos,
with all the extra-human realm.
The question immediately arises, when we make all
r-
—
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Deing thus eternally related as to how new forms of life can
originate. How does a person actually oome to "be? The answer
is as follows: '*Since the divine plan of life in its whole-
ness is a self-representative system of longings and attain-
ments, where each act expresses some particular purpose and
accomplishes that purpose, and where to every particular fact
there corresponds just the purpose that wins emhodiment in this
fact, the conscious temporal life of any teing who is explicitly
aware of his relations to God, who acts accordingly, and who
sees his act attaining its goal, must "be a Well-Order ed series
of deeds and successes, where each step leads to the next,
where there is so far no wandering or wavering, where novelty
results only from securrent processes, and where plans as a
whole do not change," It is too technical a subject to go
into a detailed explanation of the Infinite series argument.
Suffice it to say ohat it uses uhe figure of numuering in
which each nura"Der of the series implies and presupposes aj.1
that has gone before and all that shall ensue. It is thus with
any deed of aii individual life, or of aixy unique and abstract
self. So then, "a new form of selfhood means simply the appear-
ance (as in our own case), of a new type of interest in the
world, in •'rOd, and in finding the way of self-exprespion. A
new individual is thus r ever a new thin?, "but a new kind of
life--nnrpose
,
finding unirue individual embodiment in exper-
(15)
ience by means of definite acts,"
c
Absolute Gompletea Sxperience
Again, we see in the Absolute the perfection of all
human experience. Logically in an ideal presentation of the
material before us, thought and experience should not "be sep-
arated. But in the genesis of self-consciousness we have seen
that experience although not logically prior was discussed
first. So now we will see in Absolute experience all the cap-
riciousness, all the unsa">-isfactory fragmentariness of human
experience ad a way of truth finds its meaning.
By the Absolute, then, we would conceive a type of
mind and experience that has fulfilled in it all that v/e has
in idea or could think of. In our finite experience we con-
sider breadth and dept^ of viewpoint as determining the extent
of reality it is possible to know. If one has not the oppor-
tunity of coming into contact with the world-life, truth will
have but little meaning. The personality will have littl^p-
portunity for expansion, V/e think of the rustic, the back-
woodsman, the illiterate person as living the lowest type of
life. And on the ©"cher hand we look to travel and the pursuit
of study and self-development as conducive oo ohe largest grasp
of the true things of life. In general this is true, and very
few have excuse ^o miss at leaso the external means for person-
al development which crowd each Ouher. One may even knov7 im-
passively all the interrelationships of the natural world, and
of physical and even mental life that science discloses. Yet
no merely external acsiuaintance with the worla will ever take
the place of an appreciative spirit. 2o all such, whether they
are learned or unlearnea, the experiences of life bring wisdom.
c
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and an understanding heart.
It is easy to think of the flights of metaphysicians
into the suhtle reilms of pure abstraction as far removed from
life's real interests. As Berkeley would say, that their
purpose seemed to ce to conceal truth rather than to disclose
(15a)
it. Yet in the commonest experiences of life there is a
close relation to the abj^tract theory of being. ?he deeper
issues of life, though often lightly referred to, are never-
theless ofteE in ordinary conversationn I^oyoe would see in
gossip, just plain neighborhood gossip, indications of deeper
ethical significance.
IJot only that, but there is present always in dealing
with life's problems a sense of mysteriousness. There is some-
how just out of reach an elusive something that could it be
apprehended it would be real. I'his baffling feeling of mystery
is explained by philosophers of the Platonic type as due as we
have seen to our faulty conisciousnesa. Hence criticism is
not of the world, uut of human consciousness. '*Upon such crit-
icism Plato founded his conception to the Ideal V/orld, BJr
such criticism Plotinus sought to find the way upwards, through
Soul to the realm of Intellect, and beyond the Intellect to his
Absolute (One) . Through a similar criticism. Scholastic
doctrine attempted to ^urify our human t^/pe of consciousness,
until it should reach the realm of genuine spirituality, and
attain an insight a little lo\7er than that of the conceived
(14)
angelic type of intelligence." Thus we see that aoyce finds
in the Absolute Self the fulfillment of all our meaning; the
I
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supplementation of all that in us is imperfect and incomplete
and fragraentayr, with hes Perfection and Omniscience.
Ihe Absolute: Truly Good
There is left one respect in which uha A'uaoiute brings
our personalities to fulness. He is truly good and so in him
our moral failures have their explanation, True good, whcio is
of more genuine worth seems always ueyond uhe human experience.
Yet the principle of loyalty which we have seen as the main-
spring of all ethical thought action has a deeper side and
that links us with the eternal world. "It is an ©uernal world
simply because it includes all temporal hapnenings and
strivings in the conspectus of a single consciousness and ful-
fills all our rational purposes together, and is all that we
(15)
see> to be.
"
If the argument thus presented for the Absolute is
true then he is a self-conscious person wherein we exist as
partial functions. Hence our life has reality through being
in organic unity with the Absolute's whole life. At once
arises ohe problem thac becttuse of evil in finite persons
evil would uhus be present in ohe organism of which we are a
constituted part.
Hoyce meets the problem siiuarely, adraits the very
presexice of sin and aets about to establish a vindicc.tion of
it. He summarily rejects ai^y view that whuld hold evil oo Le
only illusory, or even as just transcient discipline. He
furthermore dismisses what seems any over-emphasis on the
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free-will that would externalize evil, aiid mkes it logica-lly
necessary to a perfect order. True idealism, indeed, must
face realities just as they unquestionably present themselves
to human knowledge. In it then it will read deeper significa-
tion, ultimate truth, and goodness. But ultimate reality is
not attained through ignoring actual realities but getting
them in their rational wholeness.
On the surface this seems a most, pessimistic attitude,
hut may be a basis and a deeper optimism. ^^oyce deplores ohe
present tendency of religion, and rightly so, t,o be self-
complacent and over-optimifitic in regard to sin and human de-
pravity. Too quickly a reward of good effort is hoped for;
and an implicit reliance on -he native peacefulness and good-
ness of the universe. There is a failure of "moral rigidity"
(16)
which is the "essence of the truly spiritual." Such sur-
face optimism is also most predominent in poetry.
"iCvil is not a dream, but a Ditter truth which we
(17)
make spiritual by conquering it." This then is the secret,
-
not to resign ourselves to our evil fate but to assert the
triumph of the good. Temptation or latent sin gives oppor-
tunity to vindicate the moral order. This is the same as
Hegel's view that only the tempted can be holy. V/hen terapti--
tionacoraes b: an evil impulse, if we hate it, anl then overcome
it we justify it by causing it to contribute to our larerer
moral goodness. "Moral goodness, as an attainment, is doubtless
(IB)
something very different from innocense." Thus goodness is
attained only through knowledge of and conflict with sin,-
and the tragedy is that many fall by the way.
cI
J
1^
Whatever we are or do, then, we contriDute to God's
perfection. The question is ^at do we contribute. If we are
rebels and sinners we will be scorned aiid hated but will serve
to make the Absolute complete through overcomir:? our resistence.
Hence in the end there is no finite justification for ev^]^^
L
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SU1/E:IA2Y: SYIIOrSIS
In develpping the thought of Aojgq rela"OivQ to
personality this paper has considered the person, or the iielf,
as Hoyce prefers to call it, in an ascending scale of unity and
relatedness in the world. First of all the personality is
studied genetically as Empirical Sgo, the self contained in 4nd
known only hj experience. This is a psychological description
of the rise of self-consciousness and a subsequent establishing
of the basis of selfhood. At this stage Hoyce does not give
any definition of the self. Rather it is si^iply differentiated
from the Other over against which it is constantly contrasted.
Following this distinguishing of the self of its being through
its own experience contrasted to other experience was elaborat-
ed the essential Social nature of this experience and con-
sequently of selfhood itself. The idea of contrast is carried
out in relation to the social environment as it was at first
with that .vhioh was simply physical or personal. This is a
transition to Joyce's more positive doctrine in regard to
personality. This comes to mean that the self derives its sig-
nificance in the world, its meaning, &y virtue of this relation-
ship to experience. In this same connection the idea, a
favorite later one with 3oyce, gets statement, i.e. that the
community is personal, organic and possesses the same elements
of selfhood as individuals. For him social-consciousness, in
whatever type of closely laiit com-^unity it may be found, is as
real and as vital to personal understanding and worthfulness
as self-consciousness. Logically then following the immediate
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social relationship of pars onaliiigr would come the nore lar-
reaching, metaphysical bearing -aporj all of reality. It is in
a metaphysical sense that iioyce finds the only justifiable
use of the term self or person. Y/hereas in the iSmpirical 3go
and to a less extent in the Social Self selfhood '^as fitful
and changeable, here by an ethical unity of purpose (which
one ouffht to possess), past and future are identified into
one ?elf. The very fact of will, of purDOsiveness forms the
central foundation of personal consciousness and ultimately
of reality itself. In fact personality is inextricably bound
up in this teleological relationship with the whole of being.
This whole of being is an organism in which the self performs
simply a functional part. The accomplishment of ohis close
union is in ^ large measure through the ethical concept of
loyalty. Loyalty, though, is a contribution of xioyce ratuer
to ethics thaia to metaphysics. The actual description of the
Silf of metaphysics if made by 3.0jae in a strictly logical
way. It is through what he calls the kVell Ordered iieries of
Self .^Bpres en Cations. I -s development is of such a nature
that it was deemed so important by Hoyce its general features
were outlined. In this treatment of oersonality, an i the social
treatment as well, the Self seems always somethine- intangible
and just out of reach, and always involved in meaning- beyond
itself. In the la^t chapter the culmination of :^oycean thought
is seen when the validifying of all meaning is accomplished in
the Absolute. Whereas, before the Self had been fragmentary,
incomplete, and imperfect, in the Absolute it is seen to come
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to perfect fulfillmer^t . Eloquently Hoyce argues for the
oompletion of desire, thought, and experience; and the sup-
plementation fo personality in the All-V/ise, Supremely Good
One, which most deeply we are trying to mean, whose insight
includes not only true menaing "but includes us as well.
Uohnson expresses this viewpoint thus, "Because the object you
mean cannot be independent of your meaning, and "because its
meaning cannot be wholly fulfilled in your present experience,
the object must be present to an insight that includes your
(1)
conscious intenu ai^d the larger meaniiLg, " So by way of sum-
ming up ihe main thought of .^oyce from tne standpoint of
personality, it appears that the human personality is under-
stood only in relation to the Unity oi" the Absolute Self.
Pirst every object and fact of reality is out a state of aiv-
ine Consciousness. Second and finally, all lini ce persons
are simply unique phases of the one Mind.
CRITICAL smmuHY
First of all from the viewpoint of this paper it can
be said that nersonality, at least with its customary significa-
tion, is not central in Hoycean philosophy. True it is impor-
tant but its importance lies not so much in its value in it-
self as in an analogy it offers to the True Self, The Absolute,
and its relationship thereto. As we study chis thought
relative to the human self we feel that it is something that
cannot be fully understood. V/e are ever led forward and beyond
bounds ohat are just finite, and our judgment suspended ati to
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just what the personality c onsists , until we contemplate
that Other which we are meanirjg- and in the fullest, deepest
way possible which is ourself. ^uman Personalitiy as ^oyce
views it cannot be explained or understood apart from its
setting in the p-reat community, or the V/orld Consciousness,
or TZorld Will, or the Absolui^e Self. This tends to minimize
the aci-ual place and function of "che f^elf and to make it
dependent upon ind wholly subordinate in importance to the
Self that includes it (and us). In analyzing selfhood Joyce
keeps always close to facts of experience, HowcVer, because
of an emphasis on the cosmic side, personality seems to be
somewhat objective and at a distance away. As I.lerriiigt on
expresses it: -"Self is placed with iixperience aiid even in
the Absolute, So far that is well. But the Self is not the
subject of experience. In other words, the self is pushed
into the conceptual realm, where it is very much at home
with raathmatical and other impersonal concepts. But thereby
it loses its imnediacy, its character as directly felt and
{^)
experienced, ' At the very time that Hoyce to a final de-
scription of the self, he gets over into the realm of logic.
The !i:eries of Self-.^Qk'rjresentat ions in which the human Self
virtually expresses some phase of the Absolute, mirrors it
in its own v/ay: this may serve as a metaphysical explanation
but lacks the feeling of vital and personc^l reality that we
fell personality should and does possess, iu^d meanii^g, which
plays such a part in .-ioycean interpre cation of the real, is
not meaning at all unless io is for conscious persons.

7b
Ultimate meaning is f!o far away and so impersonal that it
should seem to rjaturally te relative to meaning as selves
grasp it or within finite self, rather than the reverse as
:^oyce sees it. The unity Hoyce has built up is thus largely
lost when private selves are so central, but I wonder whether
this is not connterbalanoed by gain in faithfulness to
empirical and ethical fact.
\iQ will consider the master of freedom for instance.
In a system so overshadowed as dojo^^s is oy the Absolute, in
which finite selves are but fragmentary functional
,
expressions
we wonder at once if freedom is not sacrificed for unity.
dojQe insists &hat he has true freedom through the ethical
basis of purpose, native to reality itself. "The problem
of my freedom," he says, 'is simply the problem of my individual
ity. If I am I am nobody else, and if I am I as an expression
of purioose, then I am. in so far free just because as an in-
diviclJial, I express by my existence no will except my o\7ii."
Yet T canriot heir) but question whether a freedom that is
simply the necessary expression of some phase of the life of
the World Self, of carrying out uniquely some life purpose
or plan, is not freedom in a i^retty accomodated sense.
A certain crii-icism by V/ilson seems very apt at this
point. After showing that the self of Joyce's conception is
most active he says, "Nevertheless we should not loose
sight of the c omplementiiry fact that trie self is more thai^ the
life-plan plus self-consciousness, it is the devisor of the
plan. It finds itself in its work, but it is i-ot its work, nor
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the plari of T^he work, nor any or all aspects thereof. It is
(4)
the worker, the agent, the originator of plans." So again
in the niatter of freedom x^oyce seems to neglect the importance
of the self as saciject.
Another criticism :nade ijy uuggicro has more specif-
ically to do vviiih ohe manner in which xioyce relates the One
and the Many. He says, "Ihus xioyce's great truth, that the iigo
is the uniq.ue expression of the divine purpose, is lost when
he affirms the existence of otaer isolated expressions along-
side and oufeSide tais expression. In short, the error l^ies
in asserting a pre-existent totality, a world of heing,"
So while 3.oyce started empirically simply with the person
and his world in his metaphysics he arrives at the acceptance
of a Driori World of reality. In this world which is the time-
less, eternal life of the Absolute we are "out incidents. To
alude to I^oyce's own figure we are but notes in the whole
melody.
This matter of the self's relation to reality
while difficult to fully correlate metaphysically, au the
same time, has some salient and superior features. 2ioyce in
common with all Absolutists puts a strong emphasis on experience,
to which we have aluded before. With most of them olie absolute
is simply Jilxperience, and that in u rather aijs*-ract way, lioyce's
thought is somewhat more consisteno fend has greater applicability
than that of most Absolutists in that he makes the Absolute of
a distinctly social mture. it is a Beloved Community, of
interrelated selves. The Absolute ^perience is complete
4I
bO
Just tecause finite selves are oontrasted and supplemented
"by eaoh other. So it is that our human self-consoiousness
evolves and personality develops in social relations. So
it is that the Bojtcean doctrine of personality seems very
real and meaningful.
It can also be said of the finite self, the peeson
as Hoyce sees it is the characteristically active. The great
importance of the Absolute f?elf would seen to make a static
sort of conception; and on this Absolutists are criticized.
Yet such a criticism cannot be legitimately made of lioyce.
He not only denies that ohe "self is a passive thing, but
rejects any and every conception bhat can be exhaustively
(6)
expressed in descriptive terms." Personality in its truest
sense, as he views it, is then not some realized, fact of dawum
nature, so much as an ideal oo ue realized or approximated.
Again an important aspect of selfhood as .coyoe pre-
sents it is its ethical nature. He does not look upon person-
ality as subject to ethical considerations as if they were
something merely appended. Its very nature, for him, in being
linked so with purpose is essentially ethical. By loyalty is
expressed this kinship with the All-inclusive Self jho is All-
Good. By loyalty salvation is effected by linking selfhood
to the highest, 7;hich is the conquering element of the True
Self. To sum up, then, it can be said that while Hoyce makes
personality relative to the Absolute and thus endangers free-
dom, that after all, his finite Self is very real, very active,
and richly ethical.
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